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RECENT SCHOLARLY ASSESSMENTS of the motives of the United States
in supporting the overthrow of Queen Lili'uokalani in January of
1893 by non-native, primarily American, planters, businessmen, and
lawyers have emphasized economic and geostrategic positions. The
United States, it is argued, was developing a strong navy to defend
access to foreign markets in Latin America, Central America, Asia,
and the Pacific and was seeking bases from which to protect the new
navy. President Benjamin Harrison's quick recognition of Hawai'i's
Provisional Government and tacit approval of the landing of Ameri-
can troops in apparent support of the overthrow was (the current his-
toriographic trend has it) evidence of a new consensus in the State
Department and presidency that annexation of Hawai'i was in the
best interest of business.
President Grover Cleveland and his secretary of state, Walter Q.
Gresham, are widely credited with revoking Harrison's treaty of an-
nexation, which had been hastily negotiated with a delegation of
commissioners from Hawai'i's Provisional Government. But few his-
torians have investigated the depth or nature of Secretary of State
Gresham's opposition to annexation and to the Provisional Govern-
ment's very existence.1 More significantly, few have reviewed the
impact his principled opposition to the Provisional Government had
on events in Hawai'i from 1893 to 1895. Going beyond the cautious
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and often ambiguous anti-imperialistic position of President Cleve-
land, Gresham sought to undo the work of the Provisional Govern-
ment and the succeeding Hawaiian Republic. An analysis of Gresham's
rather astonishing independent actions to undo the overthrow of the
queen reminds us how tentative, even contradictory, U.S. foreign
policy was with respect to Hawai'i in the period 1893-1895.
Gresham (1832—1895), born in Lanesville, Indiana, was a largely
self-educated attorney. Rising in the ranks of Indiana judges, he
served honorably as a Civil War general and later as secretary of
the treasury and postmaster general under Republican Gilded Age
presidents. Breaking with the Republicans over protective tariffs,
and his personal animosity to Benjamin Harrison, a political rival
and the successful Republican candidate for the presidency in 1888,
he accepted Cleveland's offer to serve as secretary of state in 1893.
The Hawaiian delegation to Washington which petitioned Secre-
tary of State John W. Foster for annexation found Gresham to be a
"dark and vengeful man" who, having prejudged the Provisional
Government's case, was determined to reverse the outcome of the
revolution.2
Like many of Cleveland's cabinet officers, Gresham was a staunch
anti-imperialist. Typical of other prominent white, Anglo-Saxon, Prot-
estant anti-imperialists, he held a strong belief in the traditional
political values of liberty, political equality, and self-determination.
Wishing to preserve the political values and foreign policy of the late
eighteenth century, he argued that the constitution did not provide
for colonial acquisition. Overseas territories would require huge mili-
tary expenditures and increased taxes, would drag the United States
into needless wars, and would violate the nonentanglement position
of Washington's Farewell Address and Jefferson's First Inaugural.
Most significant for Gresham, imperialism and colonialism, as dem-
onstrated in the Harrison administration efforts to annex Hawai'i,
clearly illustrated the moral dangers inherent in denying self-rule to
subject peoples and in violating the essential American principle that
governments derive their legitimate powers from the consent of the
governed.3 Rejecting the argument of Hawai'i's postrevolutionary
Provisional Government that the revolution occurred because Queen
Lili'uokalani tried to remove the necessary constitutional limits on
arbitrary royal authority (and thus the revolution was defensive), he
FIG. I. Walter Quintin Gresham (1832-1895) of Indiana was Grover Cleveland's
secretary of state from 1893 to 1895, capping a career that included service as
postmaster general, secretary of the treasury, and as a U.S. circuit judge. (Library of
Congress LC-BH826-1435.)
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vowed to undo an outcome guaranteed by U.S. military intervention.
In taking this position, Gresham differed from most members of Har-
rison's diplomatic corps, who were convinced by delegates W. R.
Castle, Sr., and Lorrin Thurston that the queen's interference with
the 1887 constitution—not the plural and contradictory sugar inter-
ests—caused the revolution.4
Gresham's efforts to block annexation and to unseat the revolu-
tionaries began with his failed orchestration of the government's
attempts to restore the queen in 1893. Convinced by periodic reports
from President Harrison's representative, James Blount, that the
Provisional Government had been imposed on Hawaiians without
their consent and that only a small minority favored annexation, he
argued that the United States had disastrously supported an unjust
revolution and should undo what it had done.5
In November and December of 1893, Gresham advocated the res-
toration of the queen if she would meet Cleveland's condition that
she pardon the revolutionaries. When the new U.S. minister to
Hawai'i, Albert S. Willis, failed to get the queen's quick and unambig-
uous agreement to this condition, Gresham and his supporters in the
press and Congress lost the opportunity (which was always slight) to
restore the queen by force of arms. Cleveland also believed that U.S.
interference in the revolution of January 1893 was "disgraceful," but
was far more reluctant to force the issue of restoration than was Gre-
sham.6 Though respectful of Gresham's high-mindedness and intelli-
gence, he turned the matter of restoration over to the Democratically
controlled Congress for action. Significantly, Cleveland's difference
with Gresham over the use or threat of force to restore the queen
appears to have occurred because of a different view of American
expansionism.7 (Indeed, in part because of their differences over the
role of U.S. influence overseas, Cleveland made Gresham his secre-
tary of state only after two others had refused the office.8) Whereas
Gresham was a pure anti-imperialist who feared the consequences of
any undue U.S. influence overseas, Cleveland desired a continuing
sphere of influence in Hawai'i. The kingdom, as he saw it, would best
serve U.S. interests by remaining politically independent but amena-
ble to economic and military dependence on an industrializing U.S.
economy. He advocated continuing the 1842 Tyler Doctrine, which
had prevented European hegemony in Hawai'i while refusing to limit
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future U.S. domination.9 Toward that end, he had not objected to the
coercive negotiations with King Kalakaua in 1884 which led the
United States to acquire exclusive rights to develop Pearl Harbor as a
future naval base.10
Cleveland was pleased to pass the controversial matter of the resto-
ration of the queen on to Congress when it reconvened on December
4, 1893. Gresham, however, wanted to go further and quietly encour-
aged key Democratic leaders of the House of Representatives to
embarrass the Republicans by disavowing American minister John L.
Stevens's use of troops to restore Lili'uokalani. After much loud de-
bate, the House passed a resolution deploring the actions of Stevens,
denying the possibility of annexation, and reaffirming the U.S. pref-
erence for noninterference in the purely domestic affairs of other
countries.11
In the Senate, Gresham urged anti-imperialist Senator John M.
Palmer to make a strong moral and legal argument for restoration.
He had unsuccessfully made the same request to Cleveland when he
wrote
should not the great wrong done to a feeble but independent state by
an abuse of authority of the U.S. be undone by restoring the legitimate
government? Anything short of that will not, I suspect, satisfy the
demands of Justice.12
Again going beyond the interests of the president, Gresham prom-
ised Palmer that the State Department would cooperate with the Sen-
ate to get the facts necessary for a strong resolution for restoration.13
Gresham was particularly concerned whether the powerful Republi-
can minority in the Senate would prevent a call for restoration. More
important, the Senate Democrats, unlike their colleagues in the
House, were divided over what action to take. For example, the chair-
man of the Foreign Relations Committee, Alabama Senator John T.
Morgan, was sympathetic to annexation and enjoyed the company of
Lorrin Thurston, the loquacious representative from Hawai'i's Provi-
sional Government. Morgan held six weeks of hearings and con-
cluded that Blount had made numerous errors in his investigations
in Hawai'i; therefore no conclusions about the viability or popularity
of the overthrow could be reached. (Blount objected to U.S. troops
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FIG. 2. Lorrin Andrews Thurston (1858-1931), as Provisional Government envoy to
Washington after the 1893 overthrow, helped prepare the way for U.S. annexation of
Hawai'i. (Hawaiian Mission Children's Society.)
being landed to maintain order, remembering how his native
Georgia had been occupied against the will of most Georgians after
the Civil War.) Morgan also declared that restoration would violate
U.S. preferences for republics over monarchies. As he put it,
When a crown falls, in any kingdom of the Western Hemisphere, it is
pulverized, and when a scepter departs, it departs forever, and Ameri-
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can opinion cannot sustain any American ruler in the attempt to
restore them, no matter how virtuous and sincere the reasons may be
that seem to justify them.
He further concluded that "all intelligent men in Hawaii and the
U.S., who had taken the pains to consider the subject," favored
annexation because of the strategic and commercial advantage of
Hawai'i.14
While no other senator supported Morgan's blunt statement, the
Senate, concerned that the majority of the public would not condone
the use or threat of force to restore a monarch, failed to agree with
the House's resolution. Instead, it called for the people of Hawai'i to
decide their own political fate. The failure of restoration frustrated
Gresham, who felt Lorrin Thurston had exercised undue influence
over Morgan and others.15 Nonetheless, Gresham was pleased that
annexation was dead and the impropriety of Harrison's actions had
been laid bare. To bolster his convictions, he wrote to a host of influ-
ential friends, arguing that an intellectual case against annexation
would make it less likely to happen in the future. In addition to the
immorality of annexation, Hawai'i was, he claimed, numerically dom-
inated by non-Anglo-Saxons who by intellect and temperament were
not capable of the rigors of self-rule; honest self-rule could occur only
when Teutonic peoples organized politically.16 If Hawai'i were an-
nexed by the United States, it would ensure the incorporation of a
politically incapable and despotic people.17
Frustrated in his attempt to restore the queen, Gresham faced the
unhappy prospect of conducting normal diplomatic relations with
the Provisional Government. Given to passionate dislikes and suspi-
cious of the motives of his past political rivals, Gresham clearly planned
to make normal transactions as difficult as possible for Hawai'i's rep-
resentatives. Seeing no moral ambiguity in the action of the revolu-
tionaries and furious that Thurston and others had escaped the
consequences of their actions, he could only depend on his ability to
manipulate Cleveland and to undermine the viability of the Provi-
sional Government.18
By the spring of 1894, Gresham worried that the unstable Provi-
sional Government might be solidified and made more acceptable if
it devised a more permanent constitution. When he heard the Provi-
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sional Government was attempting to do just that by calling for a con-
stitutional convention, he wired U.S. minister Albert Willis to warn
that American citizens who participated in such an outrage might
lose the right of protection from the United States. Although Willis
did not get this bizarre warning out to American citizens before the
constitutional elections, he reported the alarm of many Americans
who had voted.19 Moreover, when Willis refused to grant full recog-
nition to the new Hawaiian Republic when it was declared on July
4, 1894 (although Cleveland did extend official recognition that
August), Gresham criticized him for offering provisional recognition
when no recognition at all should have been offered.20 Gresham's
unusual application of high moral standards in judging the legiti-
macy of a foreign regime predated and anticipated the better-known
attempts of Woodrow Wilson to deny recognition to countries not
meeting standards of morality as he defined them. Gresham's failed
attempt to break with the traditional American diplomatic practice of
de facto recognition for governments in control of their population
and meeting all financial and diplomatic obligations is a neglected
aspect of U.S. diplomatic history.
As significant as the denial of traditional recognition was Gre-
sham's petulant and sudden recalling of an American war vessel, the
Philadelphia, assigned to Honolulu. Under the direction of Admiral
John G. Walker, the warship had given additional confidence to
Sanford Dole and the leaders of the nascent Hawaiian Republic.
Moreover, to the distress of Gresham, Admiral Walker, who favored
annexation for strategic reasons, continued to send reports of inter-
nal conditions to the like-minded secretary of the navy, Hilary Her-
bert. Herbert's periodic contacts with Congressional leaders were
viewed as a distinct threat to the Cleveland-Gresham plan to prevent
annexation. To the dismay of Gresham, Walker struck up a friendship
with Dole, entertained him and members of his cabinet on board
ship, and eventually obtained permission for U.S. marines to drill in
Honolulu. This did not disturb Cleveland, who, unlike the secretary
of state, was comfortable with Walker's role and with an implied pro-
tectorate over Hawai'i which might discourage Japan and Britain
from seizing the Islands. Nonetheless, Cleveland was talked into
recalling Walker on August 2, 1894, on the premise that the admiral
had exceeded his authority by not allowing Willis the sole right to
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provide political information to Washington and negotiate with the
Republic. Walker was reprimanded and no replacement was named.22
Thus, an important implied military commitment to the Republic
had been removed.23
In early August, Gresham welcomed a delegation of the queen's
supporters to the State Department. H. A. Wildeman, J. A. Cummins,
and Samuel Parker, former royalist cabinet members, discreetly
inquired what Gresham's position would be if a coup was organized
to restore the queen. Gresham, seeing a chance to accomplish what
his own maneuvering had failed to do, assured the delegation that
"you will encounter no opposition from this government. We claim
no right to meddle in the domestic affairs of your country."24 More-
over, he told Samuel Parker a few days later, "our warships were sent
to Hawaii not to uphold the Provisional Government or its successor,
but to afford protection to such of our citizens as did not participate
in the local strifes."25 Although Cleveland would not consent to aid
the coup, no attempt to block it would be made.
Throughout the fall of 1894, rumors flew in Honolulu regarding
the possibility of a U.S.-sanctioned coup to overthrow the Republic.
The rumors were fueled by the fear of Gresham's known antipathy to
the leaders of the Republic, particularly Lorrin Thurston. Although
U.S. minister to Hawai'i Albert Willis generally discounted these
rumors as anti-Cleveland propaganda, he did wire Gresham on No-
vember 1 o to report gossip about arms being shipped to royalist con-
spirators from San Francisco. After discussions with various State
Department assistants as well as the Hawai'i charge d'affaires, Frank
Hastings, Gresham decided that Willis was unduly concerned and had
acted rashly in even suggesting a U.S. investigation. Writing Willis, he
justified State Department inaction by asserting that "Hawaii is not at
war with any other power, we have no information of an insurrection
against the present government, and we know of no statute which
would authorize the President or the head of any Department to stop
the shipment of arms from San Francisco." Since Hawai'i was a neu-
tral country, it would need to enforce its own neutrality.26
In early January 1895, royalist forces led by Robert Wilcox staged a
revolt that lasted three days and killed three people, including
Republican leader Charles L. Carter.27 Upon word from Willis that
the rumors of the arms shipment from San Francisco were true and
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the revolt had not been broadly supported by the native Hawaiian
population, President Cleveland immediately sent the warship Phila-
delphia back to Honolulu. Under Admiral L. A. Beardslee, the U.S.
military forces were limited to the traditional role of protecting lives
and property while avoiding assistance to either side in a purely do-
mestic dispute.
Fearful that New England Republican senators like Henry Cabot
Lodge would use the coup as ammunition against Cleveland and his
anti-annexationist position, Gresham chose to attack first. Working
with his closest ally in the Democratic party, Texas Senator Roger Q.
Mills, Gresham advised Democrats to prevent the possibility of a
renewed annexationist movement by suggesting that certain New
England Republican senators had a conflict of interest. Specifically,
Gresham claimed that well-connected leaders of Hawai'i's Republic,
men such as Lorrin Thurston and William R. Castle, Sr., had exer-
cised undue influence on their Congressional friends and could count
on automatic support for annexation. Moreover, Gresham urged
Mills to charge that New England Senate friends of the Republic held
Hawaiian government bonds whose value would increase if Hawai'i
became part of the United States.28 To round out the preemptive
attack, Gresham urged Mills to appeal to America's working class by
revealing how much Hawai'i's sugar plantations relied on imported,
exploited, and degraded laborers from Asia. This argument, com-
bined with an ongoing criticism of the unrepublican features of the
new Republic would, Gresham felt, forestall any movement on the
part of Congress to embarrass the Cleveland administration for its
unpreparedness in the coup.29
Not content to prevent Congressional disfavor, Gresham moved
forcefully to interfere with the trials of the Hawaiian insurrectionists.
He instructed the hapless Willis to protest against capital punishment
for the rebels, saying those claiming U.S. citizenship should have
their trials and verdicts reviewed by American authorities. Willis was
further advised to threaten the use of troops from the Philadelphia if
copies of all trial proceedings against U.S. citizens were not produced
in a timely fashion.
Under the Republic's declaration of emergency martial law, the
writ of habeas corpus was suspended. When Willis reported that a
number of aliens supporting Robert Wilcox had been arrested and
held without bail, Gresham ordered Willis to protest loudly. To what
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extent Gresham's independent action, in defiance of American prin-
ciples of nonintervention in the affairs of an independent state, mod-
erated the sentences eventually handed out to the insurrectionists is
not known. As W. O. Smith wrote Thurston, who was in Washington,
many leaders of the Republic desired strong sentences to serve as an
example to those who might consider revolt in the future. Moreover,
Willis is determined to protect the Royalists. He does not seem to see
the inconsistency in view of Cleveland's instructions not to protect
those participating! As we analyze the facts and evidence, the guilt goes
back to Cleveland, who has held out to the Hawaiians that the monar-
chy is the rightful government here, and . . . should be restored. Cleve-
land and Liliuokalani are the most guilty. Sometimes it seems horribly
wrong to think of executing Kanakas and not Liliuokalani and Grover.
Damn him!30
Though Smith names Cleveland in his letter, it was clearly Gresham
who, opposing what he considered a fraudulent government, drove
U.S. policy to moderate the consequences of the failed coup attempt.
In a final battle to undermine and discredit the Republic, Gre-
sham managed to deflect Thurston's charges regarding U.S. complic-
ity in the Wahlberg affair. Under the direction of a German captain,
the Wahlberg had delivered arms from San Francisco to the rebels in
Hawai'i. Despite substantial evidence provided by Hawai'i's minister
to the United States, Thurston, Gresham refused to take action against
the ship's owners. Seeing a chance to discredit Gresham in Congress,
Thurston leaked information of this nonfeasance to the U.S. press.
When the New York Herald first broke the story on February 13, 1895,
Gresham discovered the source of the leak and demanded Thur-
ston's recall as Hawai'i's representative.31 After the frustration of not
being able to dislodge the Hawaiian Republic, Gresham could at least
eliminate the most odious of its representatives.32 Shortly before his
death from pneumonia on May 28, 1895, he confided to close
friends that "I still have confidence in the ultimate triumph of the
right. I believe that when the American people fully understand the
Hawaiian matter, they will condemn the great wrong done the natives
by the missionaries and their descendants, supported by the U.S."33
Gresham was, of course, ultimately unsuccessful in preventing
annexationist sentiment from growing, which it rapidly did after the
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1896 election of William McKinley. He was, however, able to delay
action and shape Cleveland's Hawaiian policy. His extraordinary
efforts to depose the Provisional Government and to, at least indi-
rectly, encourage a coup against the Republic were inconsistent with
his policy of nonintervention. Despite the American public's unwill-
ingness to restore a monarch, Gresham remained tenacious in his
purpose and in his sense of moral rectitude. The combination of
national anti-imperialism with personal motives of revenge against
those who opposed him in Congress and in Hawai'i weakened his
influence in the Democratic party, embarrassed Cleveland on several
occasions, and gave Republicans like Henry Cabot Lodge and The-
odore Roosevelt issues to exploit. Anti-imperialism, still popular with
large numbers of Americans, had been somewhat discredited by its
erratic application by Gresham in the period 1893—1895. Perhaps
most importantly, a review of Gresham's independent course reminds
us how awkwardly, how tentatively, the United States began its experi-
ence with imperial acquisition.
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